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The Unfinished Agenda of Environmental Law*
Joseph L. Sax
The field of environmental law is young. Not even four decades have
passed since the basic laws for protection of air and water, and for
environmental assessment, began to be enacted in the industrialized
nations. Obviously, much has been accomplished in that relatively short
time. Today I would like to talk about what remains to be done in terms of
the law's role in safeguarding our environmental heritage. Before turning to
that matter, however, and because many of you are not specialists in this
field, I would like to make a few preliminary observations about the role of
the legal system more generally.
The primary tasks of the law are basically three-fold:
(1) to establish rules to govern daily social intercourse in commercial
areas such as contract, and to protect property and bodily security
against unwanted intrusions;
(2) to replace anarchy and self-help with the rule of law; and
(3) to articulate and safeguard basic human rights in order to protect
the individual against over-reaching by the state. In this latter
category we find essential individual rights like free speech,
freedom of religion, and basic protections for those accused of
wrongdoing. More recently, there has been growing recognition
of what are sometimes called positive human rights, such as the
right to an education, to decent housing, to a living wage and
healthful working conditions, and to basic medical care.
Where in this pantheon does one find the role of environmental law?
In its formative stages, it developed primarily to bring certain traditional
protections such as nuisance and trespass law to bear on hazards generated
by modern industrial society. For example, though law had always protected
the physical integrity of the individual against unwanted invasions,
contamination of rivers and the ambient air presented new harms in new
. Professor Sax delivered the following commemorative lecture on October
18, 2007, at the United Nations University in Tokyo, Japan.
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forms. Pollution was often caused by many different dischargers, and its
damages frequently did not appear until many years later.
Traditional legal notions, such as causation and proof of harm, all had
to be revised to take account of the complex nature of contemporary
environmental contamination. Among these revisions, one of the most
important was the recognition that a preventive strategy was necessary,
since the law usually provided only money damages after harm had been
done. This meant a need to set emission standards, to deal with scientific
uncertainty about risk, and to engage with the perplexing issues raised by
what is now called the "precautionary principle. The adaptations made to
traditional legal concepts such as nuisance, to take account of these new
elements, were among the first important achievements of environmental
law.
But, environmental law has also had to pioneer in another much less
conventional area. The most familiar example is biodiversity protection.
This problem does not arise in the form of an invasion of any individual's
established legal right, and it does not involve any conduct traditionally
viewed as wrongful. For example, farmers cultivating their fields to produce
agricultural products may be destroying valuable habitat, and contributing
to the decline in species diversity. Moreover, unlike health-endangering
pollution, many people (even today) do not see diminishing biodiversity as
a serious problem for the planet, and sometimes-especially where obscure
species with strange-sounding names are involved-do not perceive it as a
problem at all.
When conduct involves neither familiar rights nor wrongs, and
presents no imminently obvious peril, controlling it presents a distinctive
challenge for the legal system: How does one bring such a problem within
the ambit of rights that people can understand, and that the system can
accommodate?
As we began to grapple with issues like loss of biodiversity, we sought
out a precedent based on something that has virtually disappeared from the
modern world: the law of the commons,' where everyone in a community
had a stake, for example, in the maintenance of a forest's productivity for the
collection of firewood or for hunting, but no one bore individual
responsibility for protecting the forests' continued capacity to be productive.
In such settings, both the rights and the benefits were collective; they
belonged to people not as individuals but as members of a community. Of
course, commons were a feature of traditional societies, where people
thought more of themselves as members of a community than as
autonomous individuals. Moreover, in such relatively stable societies
1. 'Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAvis L. REv, 185, 189-92 (1980).
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people knew what was required of them; they did what had been done
traditionally, what their forebears did going back countless generations.
The maintenance or restoration of habitat is obviously a commons
problem, but with some unique features in the contemporary world. For one
thing, the land that comprises habitat is no longer held in common; it has
been divided up into separately owned tracts. And the notion of common
responsibility for maintaining productivity (traditional uses and limitations
known to all, and incumbent on all) has virtually disappeared from our
consciousness. In its place has arisen individually-owned property and the
entitlements that go with it. And, of course, modern property law was
devised not to assure the maintenance of biodiversity, but to promote
productivity in the sense of maximizing the economic benefit that could be
achieved by an individual proprietor.
The case of species loss is illustrative. Species require habitat. But
habitat fits no conventional legal concept. Landownership bears no relation
to the essential habitat of any species. Wildlife species are usually un-
owned and un-possessed, and endemic plant species are often competitors
with more immediately profitable crops. Most species have no economic
value to those who own the lands that are their habitat, though they may be
of extraordinary value for research that ultimately generates important
scientific and technological advances. Moreover, indigenous species are
often seen as obstacles to conventional land uses: wolves or bears as
predators on domestic livestock; wetlands denizens as a problem for land
filling and development; prairie or forest as impediments to modern
agriculture.
This history has generated a particularly difficult jurisprudential
challenge for modern environmental law. It has been obvious for some time
that we were losing biological diversity at a rapid and increasing rate, and on
a number of fronts. As rivers were dammed up for hydro power and for
irrigation and municipal water supply, spawning grounds and habitat for
indigenous species of fish were extirpated. The demand for wood products
saw the decimation of forests, first in the temperate zones, and then in
tropical areas. Mineral exploitation had similar impacts. Population growth
and urban development, like agriculture, have converted vast areas of
habitat, both uplands and wetlands, and generated a steady decline in
biological diversity. All this, of course, is very well known. What is perhaps
less well understood is how poorly prepared our legal system was to address
these issues: we faced a commons problem in a non-commons world.
In an article some years ago,2 I noted that our laws relating to natural
resources such as land and 'water have evolved over the past several
2. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433 (1993).
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centuries almost exclusively to promote what I called the transformative
economy. That economy, I said,
builds on the image of property as a discrete entity that can
be made one's own by working it and transforming it into a
human artifact. A piece of iron becomes an anvil, a tree
becomes lumber, and a forest becomes a farm. Traditional
property law treats undeveloped land as essentially inert.
The land is there, it may have things on it, or in it, but it is
in a passive state, waiting to be put to use. Insofar as it is
'doing' something-for example harboring wild animals-
property law considers such functions expendable. Indeed,
getting rid of the natural, or at least domesticating it, was a
primary task of the European settlers of North America.3
For most of the modern era, land and water have been employed essentially
to end the existence of natural systems. Land has been fenced to exclude or
extirpate wildlife so it could support domesticated grazing animals,
agriculture, mining, and human settlements.
By contrast, any notion of the importance of protecting biodiversity
builds on what may be thought of as the economy of nature, as contrasted
with the transformational or developmental economy. In the economy of
nature, land is not a passive entity waiting to be transformed by an owner.
Nor is the world composed of distinct tracts of land. Rather the ecological
perspective views land as a system defined by function, not by man-made
boundaries. Land is already at work performing important functions in its
unaltered state. Forests regulate global climate, marshes sustain marine
fisheries, and prairie grass holds the soil in place. In the economy of nature,
wetlands would be governed by laws based on their ecological role, not on
lines drawn on a map. And their protection would be the responsibility of
all those whose activities-wherever carried on-adversely affected them. If
today we are seriously to protect what remains of our biological heritage,
restore degraded rivers and landscapes, and re-deploy forests to play a
positive role in controlling human-induced climate change, we need a legal
system that is as well-attuned to achieving those goals as the conventional
legal system we have inherited was attuned through transformation of
nature to achieving the goals of the industrial revolution.
This history helps explain why the law has had so difficult a time in
dealing with the most profound of modern environmental problems, such as
biodiversity protection and climate change. When it works best, law creates
incentives that encourage people to behave in ways that promote society's
goals. Our legal system-structured on separately owned tracts of land-
3. Id. at 1442.
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was designed, and works efficiently, to achieve the goals of the
transformative society: to produce houses and cars and wheat and steel, etc.
It is quite ill-suited to meet the goals of an economy of nature, such as
biodiversity maintenance and restoration. We have collective needs, but no
collective rights. Moreover, as I shall illustrate shortly, the mentality of
many of us, including lawmakers and judges, continues to perceive the
natural world solely through the lens of the transformative economy.
It is, of course, possible that the interest in protecting the services
provided by natural systems could be protected by sovereign states outside
the category of ordinary legal rights. We have done that to some extent by
setting aside parks, wildlife refuges, marine reserves, and wilderness areas.
These were the primary techniques of the 19 th Century conservation
movement, and they continue to be necessary elements of any strategy for
biodiversity protection, but they are demonstrably not sufficient. The vast
majority of the world's land, including much of its most important and
sensitive habitat, is in private ownership or control, and is vulnerable to
private economic exploitation by owners whose conception of property
rights and of ownership responsibility contains little or no notion of any
common rights or of responsibility to the commons. In light of traditional
concepts of landownership (and usufructuary rights in water as well), that is
hardly surprising.
It is a sobering thought that while virtually every other interest that we
consider vital has been made the subject of enforceable legal rights, our
heritage of biodiversity stands largely outside the framework of established
jurisprudential theory, and thus-except to the extent governments find it in
their interest to act protectively-exposed to the ravages of human activity.
We would not think of leaving individuals to the discretion or current
policies of the government to safeguard their private property, or their
contractual rights, or their inheritances. We view all these things as
essentials and we have enshrined them as legal entitlements. They can be
invoked even if government officials at a given time decided to take no
initiative on their behalf. It is not that we do not, and should not, rely on
public officials. It is simply that we should not rely solely on them; and
where fundamental rights are in question, we never do rely solely on them.
We want and need the state to be vigilant on our behalf, but we treasure our
rights, and we know the value of being able to invoke the machinery of the
law to protect those rights.
To be sure, the notion of rights held in common among us all that are
real and serious enough to be as well protected as our individual rights, is
not the way most of us are accustomed to thinking about what is "ours." If
someone asked you to list your assets, in addition to your house and your
bank account and your jewelry, you would not likely list the polar bear or the
eagle, to say nothing of freshwater mollusks or primaeval forests, yet our
biological patrimony is among the most precious of our assets. In the
United States, we do think of places like our national parks as common
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter 2008
possessions that belong to us and that we are entitled to have protected,
but such publicly owned places embrace only a tiny fraction of the creatures,
plants and habitats that constitute the stock of our remaining biodiversity.
The task of protecting adequately our remaining biological patrimony
demands a robust development of the idea of common heritage, of things
that belong to us as members of the world community, and that are entitled
to protection at our behest in whatever particular ownership patterns they
are held. As some of you know, I have written quite a bit in recent years
about what is called "cultural property," such as great works of art, important
antiquities, and objects of historical and scientific importance.4 This has
puzzled many people, who wonder what all this has to do with
environmental law. The answer is that I became interested in studying
cultural property because it has some of the same characteristics and
presents some of the same problems of preservation and protection as does
our biological inheritance.
We tend to think of things like the Parthenon Marbles or Old Master
Paintings or the temple at Angkor Wat as part of our common cultural
heritage, and to recognize that they need to be cared for and protected,
regardless of their location or their formal ownership status. Many great
works of art are in private collections, yet we expect them to be cared for,
and ultimately to be made accessible to the public. The great English
Monument of Stonehenge was once part of a private landed estate, but that
did not make it any less worthy of preservation to humankind, both to
present and future generations. Nor does national sovereignty or asserted
national ownership, as in the tragic case of the Biyamin Bhuddas of
Afghanistan-recently mutilated by the Taliban-bestow rights of neglect or
destruction, a point that has been made against political iconoclasm at least
since the destructive frenzies experienced at the time of the French
Revolution.' The ideas, and the protective techniques, that have been
established in the field of cultural property provide some useful precedents
and analogies as we work to enlarge public understanding and to assure the
safeguarding of our biological birthright.
The distinctive character of biodiversity, as I have noted in these
remarks, presents a novel challenge to our legal system, not simply in the
technical task of formulating laws, but even in understanding of the nature
of the problem. As I have noted, the presuppositions of the transformative
society were so dominant in the thinking of many that they made it difficult
4. JOSEPH L. SAx, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES (1999).
5. Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abb. Grigoire and the
Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1159-61 (1990).
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even to perceive the real nature of biodiversity issues. Several recent cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court are depressingly illustrative of the problem.6
One such case involved implementation of the Endangered Species
Act,7 , and the question was whether the environmentally concerned citizens
who had initiated the case had a sufficient stake in the matter to be allowed
to come to court.8 (The general principle is that I can only sue to protect
some interest of my own, as where my contract is breached, or my property
is trespassed on; and the question in this case was who had a sufficient
interest in protecting an endangered species from illegal activities that were
jeopardizing its continued existence, to sue to stop that activity). In this
case, the justices characterized the sole legitimate interest of the public in
the safeguarding of endangered species as "use," in the sense that people
use the animals when they come as tourists to see and photograph them, or
use them for scientific study.9 The Court refused to allow the environmental
plaintiffs to seek enforcement of the endangered species law because they
had not proven that they personally were going to re-visit the site where the
animals lived in order to see them, and thus their personal "use" of the
species was not being affected. ° This appalling misconception of what
biodiversity is about, and what the stake of each of us is in that enterprise, is
unfortunately demonstrative of how far we have yet to go.
Nor is the case I just cited as exceptional as one might wish. In
another more recent case,' a number of the Justices showed themselves
unable or unwilling to see the scope of our water protection law in terms of
ecological connections, and voted to deny protection under the law to
wetlands unless they were physically adjacent to a river, apparently on some
notion that wetlands are land, and not water, and therefore don't come
within the ambit of a law designed to protect "the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of [the] Nation's waters."'2 The opinion says it "rejected
the notion that . ecological considerations provideld] an independent
basis for including entities like wetlands or ephemeral streams within the
phrase "the waters of the United States."'3 Whether decisions such as these
are read as purposeful anti-environmental sentiment, or as a more innocent
incapacity to see how modern environmental problems can fit into the pre-
existing legal system, the conclusion is inescapable that the notion of a
6. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
7. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2001).
8. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558.
9. Id. at 567.
10. Id. at 564.
11. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).
12. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
13. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2226.
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common heritage that vitally needs legal protection is still woefully under-
developed.
Obviously, we cannot and should not simply replace the structure of
the existing transformative economy, and its legal system, with a structure
built solely on the restoration of natural systems. No sensible person wants
to return to a state of nature. We need the positive benefits of the industrial
and post-industrial economy, but our inherited legal structure cannot stand
unaltered if we want to protect what we have, and restore what we can, of
our biological patrimony. There are many workable adaptive mechanisms
that can produce a desirable level of protection and restoration, but we need
a legal system that permits and promotes such adaptations.
One aspect of such a system requires an understanding of property
rights as being adaptive to changing public needs and to new technological
and scientific knowledge. This is well accepted at some levels. Everyone
understands that if new knowledge demonstrates something to be
hazardous to health-though it was previously a valuable property-it can
no longer be used as it was previously. Industrial waste water, once
discharged without control or limit, is a familiar example. This principle
needs to be more widely appreciated. For example, as we have discovered
the adverse impacts on fish spawning grounds of traditional water
diversions for agriculture, industry, and urban use, it must be recognized
that there is no property right to destroy a fishery or other valuable aquatic
habitat, even though that means a reduction in traditional economic uses.
This is simply one example of the proposition that a river is a common,
and must be used to secure common rights in its productivity as an aquatic
system, and isn't simply a source of private proprietary diversionary rights.
The same sort of re-conception is possible in the context of forest
management, or land development for residential and commercial use, if
previously recognized developmental rights are moderated to promote
maintenance and restoration of habitat, and the duty to do so is
acknowledged as a legally cognizable public entitlement.
While any such reconfiguration of rights will necessarily require
changes in the way business is done, and will sometimes be costly, we
should not require such changes to be compensated. The reason is that we
need a system that encourages human adaptation and ingenuity. The
familiar precept that necessity is the mother of invention is a necessary
component of a well-functioning legal system. For example when we
articulated air emission standards as legal requirements, it stimulated the
development of new technologies and new industrial practices. Often, it is
possible to implement such transitions without serious adverse
consequences to those who must undergo change. For example, in the arid
western United States, where agricultural irrigation (which uses the great
bulk of all the available water, averaging as much as 80%) must limit its
diversions in order to restore in-stream ecosystem values, newly developed
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efficiency gains in the use of water, or shifting to less water-intensive crops,
can significantly offset losses attributable to reduced diversions.
In either event, whether costly or not, property exists in a social
context, and like all rights, its limits are described by the social exigencies of
its time. For example, at one time married women could not own property;
what they owned went to their husbands upon marriage, reflecting a societal
view about women's status in society. When that value changed, we enacted
what are called Married Women's Property Acts, which revised the property
rights of husbands to their disadvantage. This same principle must govern
contemporary societal values about the responsibilities of owners to protect
our environmental heritage.
The need to revise our conception of rights in the earth and its waters
in order to re-invigorate the conception of the world as a commons, and of
rights held in common, has a long way to go before it can flower fully. So
far, we have made just a modest amount of progress. The public trust
doctrine, drawn from the ancient Roman law recognizing the sea and the
seashore as the common inheritance of humankind, open to all for
navigation and fishery, has been one of. the most useful adaptations of
traditional legal doctrines for bringing the notion of public rights and
responsibilities into the modern era.' 4 So far its application has been
limited to waters, but the underlying principle will, I am confident, find even
broader application. Two important contemporary cases in the United
States are illustrative of the way the law needs to evolve if we are to get an
adequate grip on protecting the natural values that constitute our biological
inheritance.
In the first such case, 5 the City of Los Angeles was diverting water for
municipal use from streams tributary to a large lake known as Mono Lake,
which is located directly east of Yosemite National Park in California. The
result of these diversions was to steadily diminish the elevation of the lake,
severely impacting its capacity to sustain its indigenous marine organisms,
and its use as bird habitat.'" In response to concerns expressed that the
enforcement of common rights under the public trust doctrine would either
deprive a major city of its needed water supply, or simply drive it to another
location where it might do even more harm, the government authorized the
appropriation of funds to install a variety of water-conservation programs in
the city, so as to effectively replace the lost supply by reducing demand. In
the ensuing years, the elevation of Mono Lake has risen, and its biological
values have been largely restored with no discernible adverse impact on Los
Angeles. The case stands for the proposition that the natural values in the
14. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 475-89, 556-57 (1970).
15. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
16. Id. at 711.
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Mono Lake ecosystem are an entitlement of the public, and that any uses of
the resources of that system-even though for a perfectly legitimate use-
must be made in a way that respects the protection and sustained
productivity of that system. Notably, nothing in the case suggests that
absolute preservation is required, or that the system cannot be impacted by
human use. The legal constraint is only that use must be made in a way that
does not destroy the functioning ecosystem of the lake.
A more recent Hawaii case 7 is also illustrative of how common rights
in the form of the public trust can be effectively implemented. Early in the
20 ' Century, in order to irrigate plantations on the dry (southern) side of the
island of Oahu, tunnels were drilled through the mountains, and water
diverted from streams on the northern (wet) side of the island. The result
was harm to ecosystem values in those streams and to the traditional
agriculture of Native Hawaiian people who lived near those streams. In
recent years, as the plantations were retired, diversions through the tunnels
were sharply reduced, and water again flowed in the streams. In a notable
example of the resilience of natural systems (and, incidentally, of the
positive potential of restoration efforts), there was a resurgence of life in the
streams and revived opportunities for traditional agriculture. While those
who had owned the use-rights in the water for plantation irrigation wanted
to retain those rights, presumably for planned future residential
development, an environmental case was initiated to restore ecosystem and
Native values under the rubric of the public trust in water as a common
right, rather than a merely private, perpetual property right. The Supreme
Court of the State of Hawaii issued a most interesting and important
decision recognizing public trust rights in Hawaii, and ordered the restoring
of substantial flows to implement those rights. 8 The case is of special
interest because it not only elucidates the familiar public trust doctrine with
its roots in Roman Law, but it sets out principles of traditional Hawaiian law
that lead to similar mandates for restoration. In addition, the case is
instructive because it shows that certain moments of opportunity arise (in
this case the closing of the sugar plantations on Oahu) where environmental
restoration can be effectuated without adverse impacts on existing
economic activity.
These are just two specific illustrative instances of adaptive behavior
mandated by the legal system, providing examples of the practicality of
bringing about needed change in favor of biodiversity protection and
restoration. Broadly stated, what we need is a more robust notion of
common rights and responsibilities-legally recognized and enforceable-
that we all hold as stewards of the earth, no less important than the effort
we expend to protect our stock of common scientific knowledge, or our
17. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000),
18. Id. at 501.
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literary and artistic heritage. We need a more fully developed conception of
land as habitat (and not solely as an object to be transformed and exploited
for privatized benefit). Such changes call for an increased focus on land in
terms of function, rather than in terms of boundaries. Such an approach is
the antithesis of the perception I described earlier, in which it was thought
important to decide whether a wetland is "land" or is water." It is also
antithetical to the way in which some laws still formally treat surface water
and ground water as separate legal entities, even when they are
demonstrably elements of a single geo-hydrological system.
In addition, we need increasingly to come to terms with the need for
proactive protective laws, as contrasted with the traditional legal practice of
focusing on after-the-fact remedies. We have made some considerable
progress in this respect in our modern air pollution and water pollution
laws. But the urgent issues of climate change that are at the forefront of
today's environmental agenda indicate how remiss we have often been in
getting in front of problems before they reach crisis proportions. This is in
part due to a traditional mind-set about the standards of proof needed to
set the protective machinery of the law in motion, and our traditional use of
the law largely to provide after-the-fact remedies. Whether it goes by the
name of a precautionary principle, or of simple prudence in adapting away
from the excesses of the transformative economy, these are the some of the
vital tasks that remain before us. They constitute the unfinished agenda of
environmental law.
I would like to end with a brief quotation from the American scientist
Edward 0. Wilson, who in my opinion clearly and elegantly sets out the
nature of the task before us. He said
it is reckless to suppose that biodiversity can be diminished
indefinitely without threatening humanity itself. The
ethical imperative should therefore be, first of all, prudence.
. We should not knowingly allow any species or race to go
extinct. And let us go beyond mere salvage to begin the
restoration of natural environments, in order to enlarge
wild populations and stanch the hemorrhaging of biological
wealth. There can be no purpose more enspiriting than to
begin the age of restoration, reweaving the wondrous
diversity of life that still surrounds us.'9
-end-
19. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 347, 351 (1992).
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